Philadelphia Workforce Develop v. KRA Corporation by unknown
2016 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
12-13-2016 
Philadelphia Workforce Develop v. KRA Corporation 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2016 
Recommended Citation 
"Philadelphia Workforce Develop v. KRA Corporation" (2016). 2016 Decisions. 1080. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2016/1080 
This December is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2016 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
  
 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 16-1327 
_____________ 
 
PHILADELPHIA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION 
 
 v. 
 
 KRA CORPORATION, 
            Appellant  
_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. No. 2-09-cv-05261) 
District Judge:  Hon. Wendy Beetlestone 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
November 3, 2016 
 
Before:   JORDAN, GREENAWAY, JR., and RENDELL, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: December 13, 2016) 
 _______________ 
 
 OPINION  
 _______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 This appeal involves a contract dispute between KRA Corporation, a for-profit 
workforce development services management company, and Philadelphia Workforce 
                                              
  This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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Development Corporation (“PWDC”), a non-profit entity responsible for overseeing 
federal and state programs to help unemployed or underemployed Philadelphians develop 
job skills.  PWDC contracted with KRA for the latter to manage some of those programs.  
After an audit by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania found that PWDC had overpaid 
KRA by over two million dollars, PWDC refused to pay KRA for certain invoiced but 
not-yet-paid work.  PWDC sued to recover the money that it claims it overpaid KRA, 
while KRA sought to compel PWDC to pay the money it claims is still owed.   
 KRA argues that the contract allowed it to keep as profit all of the payments it 
received upon meeting certain performance benchmarks, regardless of how much money 
it expended to administer the programs.  PWDC urges, to the contrary, that the contract 
cabins profit and requires KRA to return most of the revenue that exceeded expenditures.  
The District Court determined that the contract was ambiguous and left interpretation of 
it to the jury.  The jury returned a verdict for PWDC.   
 On appeal, KRA challenges the determination that the contract was ambiguous.  It 
also takes issue with several evidentiary rulings, and contends that there was insufficient 
evidence to support PWDC’s decision to withhold payments for certain indirect costs 
incurred by KRA.  We conclude that the contract was ambiguous, that none of the 
evidentiary rulings amount to reversible error, and that the evidence was sufficient to 
allow the jury to accept PWDC’s indirect cost calculations.  We will therefore affirm.   
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I.  BACKGROUND  
 A.  Factual Background  
 PWDC acts as the fiscal agent for the City of Philadelphia in administering 
services for the unemployed or underemployed,1 including a variety of workforce 
development and skills training programs.  In 2005, PWDC began contracting with both 
for-profit and non-profit organizations to provide personalized career guidance to city 
residents and to operate Employment Advancement and Retention Network Centers 
(“EARN Centers”) where Philadelphians can receive assistance in finding and retaining 
employment.     
 In such a contract entered in 2007, KRA agreed to operate two EARN Centers for 
the 2008 fiscal year. 2  The first was in Germantown and the second in West Philadelphia 
on or near Delancey Street.  During FY 2009, KRA continued to operate the two centers 
and also began offering Job Specific Skills Training (“JSST”) programs for dental 
assistants and phlebotomists at the Delancey location.     
 PWDC utilized three types of contracts to govern its relationship with contractors 
like KRA.  The first was a cost-reimbursement model in which the contractor was 
reimbursed for direct and indirect costs, including profit categorized as an administrative 
expense.  The second provided for performance-based payments requiring a contractor to 
                                              
1 In 2012, PWDC merged with another entity, the Philadelphia Workforce 
Investment Board to form a new entity, Philadelphia Works, Inc.  That merger does not 
impact this appeal.  
 
2 Fiscal Years run from July 1 of one year through June 30 of the next.   
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meet certain benchmarks before being paid.  The third type of contract, the one that 
governed the relationship between PWDC and KRA, was a hybrid that featured both 
cost-reimbursement and performance-based payments.  Under hybrid contracts in 2008 
and 2009, KRA was immediately reimbursed an amount up to a fixed percentage of the 
cost to run each center.  It was also fully reimbursed for money expended on direct client 
services.  KRA received additional payments as it achieved predetermined performance 
benchmarks.   
 During FY 2008, the relationship proceeded according to the terms of the contract.  
KRA ran the EARN centers, invoiced PWDC, and received payment in a timely fashion.  
It is undisputed that KRA met its performance benchmarks.  But the relationship changed 
when, in May of 2009, pursuant to the terms of the contract, the Bureau of Financial 
Operations of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania audited PWDC’s payments to KRA.  
The Commonwealth concluded that KRA had inflated its reported expenses and therefore 
had been paid 2.2 million dollars ($2,219,060) more than it was owed.  Consequently, in 
June 2009, PWDC suspended payments to KRA and launched an internal audit of 
pending invoices.  The internal audit concluded that 1.9 million dollars ($1,932,991.08) 
of invoiced payments should not be paid.  Of particular relevance to this appeal, the audit 
found that KRA failed to properly document administrative costs.     
 Because of a budget impasse in Pennsylvania in 2009, PWDC was unable to fully 
negotiate new contracts with the entities running its EARN Centers, and so it authorized 
those entities to continue operating the centers on a cost-reimbursement basis.  KRA thus 
kept operating the Germantown and Delancey EARN Centers and JSST programs for a 
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while.  After PWDC withheld all payments from KRA because of the disputed FY 2008 
overpayments, KRA stopped operating the EARN centers in October 2009, which fell 
within FY 2010.   
 That same month, PWDC sued KRA seeking damages for breach of contract, 
replevin, and conversion, arguing that KRA was overpaid and failed to return the 
overpayment.  KRA filed counterclaims seeking payments that PWDC withheld.  PWDC 
conceded that KRA was owed nearly sixty thousand dollars ($59,190) from FY 2009 and 
nearly two million dollars ($1,998,719) for its work during FY 2010.  But once those 
amounts were deducted from the amount it said it had overpaid KRA, PWDC demanded 
one hundred and sixty thousand dollars ($161,151) from KRA.      
 B.  Procedural Background  
At trial, each side presented sharply contrasting theories of contract interpretation.  
The central dispute was over whether the FY 2008 contract required performance-based 
payments to be somehow linked to expenditures.  KRA argued that the contract 
unambiguously entitled KRA to full payment for all performance benchmarks achieved.  
PWDC, on the other hand, argued that performance-based payments in excess of 
expenditures constituted excess profit that had to be returned to PWDC.  KRA moved for 
summary judgment, which was denied, and then made a motion in limine before the start 
of trial seeking to exclude parol evidence regarding the proper interpretation of the 
contract.  The District Court rejected KRA’s argument and concluded that the contract 
was ambiguous.  As a result, the Court allowed extrinsic evidence to be presented to the 
jury.  Over KRA’s objection, the jury was allowed to consider the Commonwealth’s audit 
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report and so-called Subcontractor Expenditure Summary forms completed by KRA at 
the end of FY 2008, which reported that KRA did not have excess program income to 
return to PWDC.   
 KRA was not only on the losing end of rulings that allowed evidence in, it also 
lost on rulings that kept evidence out.  The Court excluded certain documents produced 
by KRA in response to PWDC’s audit.  Those documents were offered to justify some of 
the payments that had been disallowed by PWDC.  The Court also excluded, as 
irrelevant, an e-mail from PWDC’s former President to a Commonwealth official.  The 
email discussed changes to PWDC’s budget proposal for FY 2010, which would cap “the 
amount that EARN Centers can earn for each performance benchmark[.]”  (App. at 
2586.)  According to the email, the changes were “absolutely necessary” since “[l]ast 
year most centers earned above the contract amount in certain performance benchmarks, 
which ‘busted’ the budget but did not get … the desired results[.]”  (Id.)   
 At trial, PWDC and KRA continued to dispute the propriety of PWDC’s 
disallowance of certain payments sought by KRA for FY 2009.  KRA claimed that 
PWDC did not have evidence to support those disallowances.  But PWDC presented its 
audit report and testimony from those who had prepared it.   
 After hearing extensive testimony, the jury ruled in favor of PWDC.  It adopted 
PWDC’s damage estimates in full and concluded that KRA owed PWDC $161,151.  
KRA filed a motion for judgment as a matter of law or for a new trial.  The Court denied 
the motion, and KRA filed this timely appeal.   
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II.  DISCUSSION3  
 KRA raises three challenges before us.  First, it argues that the District Court 
improperly concluded that the FY 2008 contract was ambiguous.  Because KRA urges 
that the contract was unambiguous, it likewise believes that parol evidence should not 
have been admissible and that the jury should not have been permitted to consider 
PWDC’s interpretation of the contract.  Second, KRA claims that the District Court erred 
when it admitted into evidence certain documents introduced by PWDC and excluded 
others introduced by KRA.  Finally, KRA challenges specific payment disallowances for 
indirect costs incurred during FY 2009.  We address each of those arguments in turn.   
A.  Contract Ambiguity and Parole Evidence  
 Pennsylvania law, which governs the interpretation of the contract, permits 
extrinsic evidence “where a term in the parties’ contract is ambiguous[.]”  Yocca v. 
Pittsburgh Steelers Sports, Inc., 854 A.2d 425, 437 (Pa. 2004).  “Determining whether a 
contract is ambiguous is a legal question, and our review is plenary.”  Pacitti v. Macy’s, 
193 F.3d 766, 773 (3d Cir. 1999).  A contract is ambiguous when “it is reasonably or 
fairly susceptible of different constructions and is capable of being understood in more 
senses than one and is obscure in meaning through indefiniteness of expression or has a 
double meaning.”  Duquesne Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 66 F.3d 604, 614 
(3d Cir. 1995) (quoting Samuel Rappaport Family P’ship v. Meridian Bank, 657 A.2d 17, 
21-22 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995)). 
                                              
3 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1332.  We have jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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 If a contract is ambiguous, then “a decision as to which of the competing 
interpretations of the contract is the correct one is reserved for the factfinder, who would 
examine the content of the extrinsic evidence (along with all the other evidence) in order 
to make this determination.”  Bohler-Uddeholm Am., Inc. v. Ellwood Grp., Inc., 247 F.3d 
79, 94 (3d Cir. 2001).   
 We agree with the District Court that the FY 2008 contract between PWDC and 
KRA was ambiguous.  Ambiguity arises from three parts of the contract.   
To begin with, the definition section of the contract defines two closely related key 
terms – “program income”4 and “profit”5 – in an internally inconsistent fashion.  
                                              
4 Whether KRA’s revenue is considered program income is perhaps the most 
bitterly contested issue in this case.  A portion of the contract explicitly states that “[a]ll 
program income … realized in operating a program provided for under this agreement … 
shall be reported and returned to PWDC.”  (App. at 1066.)  Program income is defined as 
“income” derived from a variety of sources such as interest, rental and service fees, and 
the sale of commodities.  KRA argues that, as a commercial organization, its revenue is 
not considered program income and need not be returned to PWDC.  (See App. at 759 
(defining program income, in part, as “revenue in excess of costs earned by organizations 
other than those that are commercial”).)  PWDC, in contrast, argues that a more general 
clause applies to all payments including those earned by for-profit organizations such as 
KRA.  (See id. (defining program income in performance-based contracts to “include[] 
the difference between the payments received for completing the performance 
benchmarks and the actual expenses incurred in operating the program during the 
program year”).)    
 
5 KRA and PWDC specifically argue over whether the contract puts any limits on 
KRA’s ability to earn profit.  Profit is defined as “an amount in excess of the cost 
necessary to operate a program.”  (App. at 759-60.)  PWDC argues that the contract only 
allows profit under a cost-reimbursement contract.  (See id. (“Profit is allowable under a 
cost-reimbursement agreement to the extent that it is determined reasonable during 
contract negotiations.”).)  Alternatively, it argues that the contract cabins profit to no 
more than 10% of the reimbursable costs.  (See id. (noting that “the combination of profit 
and administrative cost must not exceed 10%”).)  KRA on the other hand argues that the 
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Consequently, KRA and PWDC were both able to offer plausible interpretations of those 
terms.  
Next, the method of payment section, the portion of the contract that describes the 
process KRA used to invoice costs and record expenses, is ambiguous as to whether or 
not KRA was required to maintain records of expenses incurred in order to receive 
performance-based payments.  KRA was “responsible for maintaining adequate 
books/records to document the costs incurred to execute programming under th[e] 
contract.”  (App. at 764.)  That contractual language is consistent with PWDC’s position.  
On the other hand, the same section lists supporting documentation that a party may 
provide when seeking reimbursement under a performance-based contract, but the list 
conspicuously omits documentation regarding expenditures.  (See App. at 764 (listing 
supporting documentation as including “copies of enrollment reports, attendance records, 
employment verification forms, pay stubs and/or copy of completion certificates or 
paperwork.”).)  
Finally, the budget, which is contained in Rider A and incorporated by reference 
into the contract, offers some support for KRA’s position but remains open to PWDC’s 
reading as well.  It sets out all of the expected payments under the contract, including the 
total “Prospective Performance Based-Payments” for which KRA could qualify.  (App. at 
796.)  That amount is listed without any reference to cost, and the budget only mentions 
that KRA would be subject to a quarterly performance review to determine whether KRA 
                                                                                                                                                  
contract is silent as to profit under hybrid contracts and that therefore such profit is 
permitted without limits.  
 
 10 
 
“is meeting the performance goals” set out in the contract.  (App. at 798.)  KRA relies 
heavily on the absence of any language linking performance-based payments to actual 
expenses.  PWDC, however, rightly points out that nothing in the budget is incompatible 
with PWDC’s reading or forecloses the possibility of requiring the return of program 
income in excess of costs.  
KRA argues that those ambiguities should be resolved in its favor due to policy 
considerations.  Specifically, it claims that, since the risk of loss for failing to meet 
performance-based metrics would be too great without a commensurate opportunity to 
earn unconstrained profit, no for-profit entity would enter into a contract under the terms 
described by PWDC.  But Pennsylvania law instructs that “ambiguous writings are 
interpreted by the finder of fact.”  Ins. Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 905 
A.2d 462, 469 (Pa. 2006).  Here, the District Court rightly concluded that there was 
ambiguity.  The jury then heard the parties’ positions and decided against KRA.  
“[V]iewing all the evidence which ha[d] been tendered and should have been admitted in 
the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion,” we cannot say that “no jury 
could decide in [PWDC’s] favor.”  Walter v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 985 F.2d 1232, 1238 (3d 
Cir. 1993) (citation omitted). 
B.  The District Court’s Evidentiary Rulings  
 KRA challenges several of the District Court’s evidentiary rulings.  We review 
decisions to admit or exclude evidence for abuse of discretion.  See United States v. 
Furst, 886 F.2d 558, 571 (3d Cir. 1989).  
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 1.  Inclusion of Evidence 
 KRA challenges the admission of the Commonwealth’s audit, arguing that it was 
inadmissible hearsay.  The District Court agreed that the audit was hearsay but concluded 
that it was still admissible under the hearsay exception for regularly conducted business 
activities.  FED. R. EVID. 803(6)(B).  Because there was evidence presented at trial that 
the audit was made and kept in the ordinary course of business, the Court was within the 
bounds of its discretion in ruling that the audit could be admitted.     
 KRA also argues that the audit and the Subcontractor Expenditure Summary forms 
were irrelevant.  We disagree.  Relevance is a low bar and those documents undoubtedly 
clear it.  See FED R. EVID. 401.  The audit supported PWDC’s damage calculations.  The 
forms showed that PWDC’s contemporaneous understanding of the contract term 
“program income” was fully compatible with its theory at the time of trial, so the forms 
were capable of assisting the jury in its effort to understand the contract.  The Court did 
not abuse its discretion by admitting the documents.  
  2.  Exclusion of Evidence 
 KRA also challenges the exclusion of evidence it offered.  The documents it 
submitted to try to reconcile its claims with expenditures were not documents “kept in the 
course of a regularly conducted activity of a business,” nor was producing those 
documents “a regular practice” of KRA.  FED. R. EVID. 803(6)(B), (C).  They were 
therefore properly excluded as inadmissible hearsay. 
 The District Court’s decision to exclude the email authored by PWDC’s President 
is another matter.  The Court dismissed that email as irrelevant, but it is hard to see how 
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that could be so since it bore directly on how the budget was affected by contractual 
benchmarks.  It was written soon after the end of FY 2009 and discussed how contracts in 
that year for EARN centers had worked out financially.  PWDC’s President’s statement 
that many of the EARN centers “earned above the contract amount in certain 
performance benchmarks” and that those payments “‘busted’ the budget” could have 
given the jury a basis for accepting KRA’s interpretation of the contract.  (App. at 2586.)  
If performance payments had “busted” the budget, then the jury could have concluded 
that PWDC had not cabined profit to 10% and had instead allowed contractors to keep all 
of their profits.   
 But even if the District Court should have allowed the e-mail into evidence, the 
error was harmless.  It is highly likely that the admission of the e-mail would not have 
altered the jury verdict.  See McQueeney v. Wilmington Trust Co., 779 F.2d 916, 917 (3d 
Cir. 1985) (holding that nonconstitutional errors in civil suits “are harmless only if it is 
highly probable that the errors did not affect the outcome of the case”).  While the e-mail 
could have supported KRA’s interpretation of the contract, it also could be interpreted in 
harmony with PWDC’s interpretation.  Testimony at trial suggested that the budget was 
“busted” as a result of the mandate that an EARN center accept all “clients that are 
referred to that EARN Center.”  (App. at 512.)  In light of the economic downturn, there 
was greater demand for the services of the EARN Center and therefore PWDC incurred 
unusually high expenses.  (App. at 512.)  And, overall, PWDC’s case was strong.  Even 
some of the witnesses called by KRA supported PWDC’s interpretation of the contract.  
Indeed, KRA’s own internal audit supported PWDC’s position that excess payments 
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needed to be returned to PWDC.  (See App. at 2526 (noting that KRA “does not maintain 
any equity in the contract and any excess of cash received from Philadelphia Workforce 
Development Corporation over final expenditures is due back to Philadelphia Workforce 
Development Corporation”).) 
 Given the ease with which PWDC could have drawn KRA’s interpretation of the 
e-mail into question, and the strength of the evidence against KRA, we conclude that it is 
highly probable that the exclusion of the e-mail did not affect the outcome of the case.  
McQueeney, 779 F.2d at 917.  
C.  Indirect Cost Calculations  
The final issue before us concerns PWDC’s decision to disallow payment of 
administrative costs that KRA incurred during FY 2009.6  The budget filled out at the 
start of the fiscal year stated that KRA could be reimbursed for approximately one 
million dollars in administrative costs and other indirect costs ($490,472 for the Delancey 
EARN Center and $462,030 for the Germantown EARN Center).  In the budget, those 
costs were broken down into categories (salaries, fringe benefits, operating expenses, 
equipment, supplies, indirect costs, other, and profit).     
                                              
6 In its brief, KRA also seems to broadly challenge all of PWDC’s FY 2009 
disallowances.  But the administrative and indirect cost disallowances are the only ones 
that KRA points to with any specificity.  We therefore find that KRA has failed to 
preserve its arguments regarding PWDC’s other disallowances.  See Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 
1 F.3d 176, 182 (3d Cir. 1993) (recognizing that it is well settled “that casual mention of 
an issue in a brief is cursory treatment insufficient to preserve the issue on appeal.” 
(citing Simmons v. City of Philadelphia, 947 F.2d 1042, 1066 (3d Cir. 1991))).  
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PWDC’s internal audit found that KRA failed to adequately account for and 
categorize its administrative costs and instead lumped all of its administrative costs into 
the general category of “indirect costs.”  PWDC therefore disallowed all administrative 
costs for FY 2009.  KRA, on the other hand, argues that it did not need to break out its 
administrative costs into categories because it had an agreement with the federal 
Department of Health and Human Services setting a fixed rate for the reimbursement of 
indirect costs, and so it could properly place all of its administrative costs into that 
general category.     
KRA and PWDC both make plausible arguments based on contradictory parts of 
the FY 2009 budget.  In the budget’s breakdown of administrative costs by category, 
KRA is not entitled to reimbursement for indirect costs.  A few pages later, however, the 
budget lists a reimbursement rate for indirect costs and a large “base” value for 
reimbursable indirect costs.  (App. at 1333.)  Those two sections of the budget seem to 
contradict each other.  
Even though KRA could point to language supporting its argument, it did not 
otherwise offer evidence in support of its theory.  The section that KRA relies on requires 
that “[a] copy of the current negotiated rate, supporting the base and rate must 
accompany the proposal.”  (App. at 1333.)  No such negotiated rate accompanied the 
budget.  And, at trial, KRA failed to produce the negotiated rate or any evidence that it 
had a fixed rate agreement with the Department of Health and Human Services.  In 
contrast, PWDC put forth witnesses who testified that PWDC had conducted a line-by-
line audit of all of KRA’s claimed expenses and that the amounts that PWDC had 
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disallowed were consistent with the audit findings.  Because of KRA’s failure to 
substantiate its claims, the jury was free to accept PWDC’s evidence and conclude that 
KRA had erroneously lumped all of its administrative costs into the category of indirect 
costs. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm.   
